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Abstract 
The entry and exit decisions, considered as investment decisions, are 
investigated in the paper. Taking into account the heterogeneity of entry and 
exit, the analysis is based on two types of entry-exit: real (related to the 
establishment or closing of a firm), or entry-exit in a new sector (indicating the 
diversification or changing specialisation). The theoretical model is based on 
Marshallian trigger points with Real Option trigger points as an alternative. 
The estimation exploited the negative binomial model to investigate the role of 
trigger points (thresholds) on the observed number of entry or exit firms in 
Dutch glasshouse horticulture over 25 years.  Firms should overcome different 
thresholds depending on types of entry and exit. Marshallian trigger points 
function as good as the ones based on Real Option theory. The estimation of 
the model, which takes into account expected output prices, uncertainty and the 
interest rate, however, provides the best explanation of entry and exit. That 
model can be considered of a flexible variant of Real Option theory. The model 
provides plausible elasticities of entry and exit, either real or in changing 
specialisation. 
 
Keywords: entry and exit, trigger points, glasshouse horticulture 
 
1. Introduction   
 
Entry and exit decisions of firms belong to the most interesting, but also 
highly intricate steps of individuals or firms. Moreover there are at least three 
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different types of entry or exit decisions (Goncharova, 2007: 110-113); each of 
them with their own dynamics.  
Decisions about entry or exit are accompanied by investments that are 
likely to be irreversible. These two different decisions, which are crucial for the 
firm, have profound implications for economic growth. Entry and exit of firms 
can be beneficial for productivity growth, technological upgrading and 
employment generation. According to the OECD (2003), the entry and exit of 
firms accounts for 20-40% of total productivity growth in eight selected OECD 
countries.  
By considering entry as an investment decision and exit as disinvestment 
(=negative investment), investment theory contributes to explain industry 
dynamics. The economic literature suggests different theoretical and empirical 
approaches to explain choices of entry, exit and size of firms ( for an overview 
see, for example, Siegfried and Evans, 1994). This paper is based on 
Marshall’s model of long-run and short-run equilibria, which assume that firms 
are induced to enter if current revenue exceeds sunk costs (“Marshallian trigger 
point”) and to exit if revenue falls below sunk costs.  
However, it is observed that firms sometimes prefer to delay an entry or 
exit decision, in the expectation that prices and revenue (or costs) can change 
in the future. The real option theory postulates that uncertainty will affect the 
entry-exit investment decisions in such a way that it will change trigger points 
In the model of Dixit (Dixit, 1989; Dixit, 1992), a wedge between the 
Marshallian trigger point and “observed” trigger point produces a zone of 
“hysteresis” in which firms do not respond to price signals.  
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether investment trigger 
points contribute to the explanation of the number of entering and exiting firms 
for Dutch glasshouse horticulture. We try also to answer the question whether 
trigger points based on real option theory explain entry and exit behaviour 
better than Marshallian trigger points. 
Dutch glasshouse horticulture can be characterised as a dynamically 
changing, highly competitive, and capital intensive sector. The evolution and 
adaptation of the sector to new technologies and market requirements are 
reflected in the process of firms’ entry and exit.  
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Section 2 presents first the theoretical model and then the empirical models 
of entry and exit. The negative binomial econometric model is used for 
estimation. Section 3 discusses the data, and provides an analysis of changes in 
trigger points over time as well as the comparison of different types of trigger 
points. Section 4 provides estimation results indicating the effect of trigger 
points on entry and exit. Finally, Section 5 closes a short discussion, and some 
concluding and qualifying remarks. 
 
 
2. Modelling of entry and exit investment decisions 
2.1. Theoretical model  
 
The long-run competitive equilibrium is determined not only by the price 
and output levels of the firms but also by the number of operating firms. 
Following MasCollel et al. ( 1995, p. 335 ) the central assumption is: “A firm 
will enter the market if it can earn positive profits at the going market price and 
will exit if it can make only negative profits at any positive production level 
given this price.”  
The long-run equilibrium price (p*) equates demand with long-run supply, 
where the long-run supply takes into account firms’ entry and exit investment 
decisions. Consider an industry initially in a long-run equilibrium position, 
which assumes number N0 of operating firms and long-run cost c (Figure 1, a). 
Suppose that demand shifts upward, then the industry will immediately move 
to a new short-run equilibrium position. The shock in demand causes an 
increase in prices to pS and the output per firm increases to qS; this can 
influence the investment decision of firms. Because firms’ profits increase, 
operating firms earn more in the short-run (due to pS>c) and can even be 
induced to make investments to expand; inactive firms can be induced to invest 
in entry. 
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Figure 1: Impact of trigger points on Entry and Exit 
 
In the long run, firms enter in response to the increase in profit, with the 
number of firms increasing to N1>N0; the industry will then move to the right 
along a new demand curve until it reaches the new long-run equilibrium.  
The graph (b) demonstrates the change in the number of firms as a result of 
the exit of firms as an adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium. In the long 
run, firms exit in response to the decrease in profit, with the number of firms 
falling to N1<N0.  
Now, consider that a firm’s profit-maximising investment decision is to 
enter or to remain inactive. A firm has to invest a lump sum k and will have a 
variable cost w for the production of output. In the case of an exit decision, it 
must also pay a lump sum l, which it loses due to the exit of the firm, and a 
variable cost w, which will be saved. The goal of the firm is to maximise 
expected net present value (NPV). The standard Marshallian theory (Marshall, 
1920) postulates that a firm will invest (and enter) if expected NPV is greater 
than zero, and in the case of an operating firm a decision to exit will be 
undertaken when NPV is negative.  
Then for the entry investment of a firm, the trigger point HW  is Marshall’s 
long run cost (when NPV>0), which is the sum of the variable cost and the 
interest on the sunk costs:  
kwWH ρ+≡          (1) 
where ρ  is interest rate. 
The Marshallian trigger point for exit disinvestment of a firm (NPV<0) 
becomes:  
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lwWL ρ−≡          (2) 
Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) introduced a discussion 
concerning a difference between Marshallian trigger points and Real Option 
trigger points. The difference can be explained by the presence of uncertainty 
that causes a firm to consider the option of waiting. Dixit (1989) provides the 
following relationships for the Real Option entry PH and exit PL trigger points:  
HH WkwP ≡+> ρ         (3) 
LL WlwP ≡−< ρ         (4) 
Dixit (1989) derives analytically a closed form solution for trigger points 
that take into account uncertainty and the effect of changes in expectation of 
output prices ( µ ), uncertainty ( 2σ ) and interest rate ( ρ ) on trigger points.  
2.2. Empirical model 
 
From equations (1-2) we can numerically calculate Marshallian entry and 
exit thresholds. 
In the case of Entry, firms consider parameters of a potential sector to 
enter, consequently ρ  is an average value indicating the current profitability of 
the sector as perceived by a potential entrant. kw,  are operating costs in the 
first year and the costs of capital; they represent the sunk costs of entrant firms. 
These individual characteristics of a firm are also important, because when the 
firm decides on entry it takes into account the level on which it is going to 
operate.  
In the case of Exit, ρ  is the same as for entry firms, but w and l are 
operating costs of the previous year and irreversible costs of capital; this 
represents sunk costs of the exit of firm j. To calculate losses l due to exit, we 
also include loss of profit because the firm no longer operates. 
The changes in the number of entering or exiting firms indicate investment 
(or disinvestment) decisions of firms. According to the empirical model 
represented in Equations 5-6, we estimate the impact of investment trigger 
points on entry (5) or exit (6) decisions:  
t
i
t
iHi
t TREntry ηγ +=
,,1         (5) 
t
jjLj
t TRExit ηγ +=
,,1         (6) 
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where t iHTR , is the calculated threshold of a firm i, that entered in time t, and 
t
jLTR , is the calculated threshold of a firm j, that exited in time t. 
Marshallian trigger points ( HW  and LW ) are calculated as shown in 
Equations 1-2; Real Option trigger points ( HP  and LP ) are calculated as shown 
in Dixit (1989) and Goncharova (2007: 126). Additional variables, following 
Real Option theory, have an impact on trigger points and perception about the 
profitability of the sector. They are the trend rates of growth of the market 
price of output µ  and its variance 2σ . 
tEntry
 is the number of firms entering in the year t; tExit  is the number 
of firms that were previously observed to be in operation in the year t. tη - is an 
error term, a subscript i indicates an entering firm,  j indicates an exiting firm, 
and γ - is the parameter to be estimated.  
As a possible modification of the model based on Marshallian trigger 
points, we include ρσµ ,, 2  as additional variables in the Equations 5-6, 
thereby assuming that these parameters have an impact on the firm’s decision 
concerning entry/exit, but their impact is more flexible than assumed by Real 
Option theory.  
2.3. Econometric model 
 
Since the dependent variable in the entry (exit) equation is the number of 
firms entering (exiting), this can take only nonnegative integer values. A count 
is understood as the number of times an event occurs. The ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method for even count data results in biased, inefficient, and 
inconsistent estimates (Long, 1997). Thus, various nonlinear models that are 
based on the Poisson distribution were developed for this type of “count data”.  
The Poisson regression is 
)(~ ii Poissony µ                  (7) 
)exp( ii x=µ                     (8) 
for observed count iy  with covariates for the i-th observation.  
The Poisson model assumes that its mean is equal to its variance, which is 
unlikely in reality. This leads to a problem of overdispersion, i.e. that the 
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observed variance is greater than the mean ( )()var( ii yEy > ). One reason for 
this is the omission of relevant explanatory variables. Estimates of a Poisson 
model for overdispersed data are unbiased, but inefficient with standard errors 
biased downward (Cameron and Triverdi, 1998; Long, 1997). The most 
common alternative is the Negative Binomial model, which introduces an 
individual, unobserved effect into the conditional mean. 
)(~ *ii Poissony µ                    (9) 
)exp(* iii ux += βµ                         (10) 
),/1(~ λλGammae iu      
λ  is the overdispersion parameter. The larger α  is, the greater the 
overdispersion. If λ  =0 then the model converges to the Poisson model. A 
more detailed description of the Poisson model and the negative binomial 
model can be found in Cameron and Triverdi (1998: 59) or Greene (2003: 
744).  
3. Data 
 
This section first gives a description of the data used in estimation and then 
presents an analysis of calculated trigger points, which are used as independent 
variables in the model.  
We combine two data sets: FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) and 
“Meitelling” data1, provided by the LEI. Table 1 gives the variables used for 
estimating thresholds, and for the econometric specification of the model.  
“Meitelling” data provide us with information about all firms in the 
glasshouse horticulture sector, but also other sectors, during the period 1975-
2004. If a firm exited and entered during these time periods then we have the 
complete record of the “firm’s life”: from “birth” to “death”. Although the 
coverage of glasshouse horticulture firms is good, the data content is fairly 
small. Basically, only the land and the numbers of employees are available.  
 
                                                 
1
 Meitelling is the Register of Enterprises and Establishments of agriculture firms in the 
Netherlands. The register covers all firms with a size equal to or bigger than 2 nge (Dutch Size 
Units). www.lei.nl   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Glasshouse Firms, Thresholds and 
Number of Entry and Exit 
Variable Description of Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
    
Ha_tot Land per firm, ha 2.31 0.33 
Ha_glass Land under glass per firm, ha 0.62 0.11 
Profit_ha Profit per ha, 1000 Euros* 59.0 17.7 
Cost_mat_ha Material cost per ha, 1000 Euros* 234.8 44.3 
Lab_tot Number of workers per firm, annual 
workers 
3.4 5.4 
Cost_lab Labour cost per annual worker, 1000 
Euros* 
20.3 0.5 
Inv_ha Investments per ha, 1000 Euros* 26.9 8.3 
 µ  Trend rate of growth of output prices 0.06 0.01 
σ  Standard deviation of output prices 0.14 0.02 
ρ  Interest rate, % 7.63 1.67 
    
EntryK  Number of entering firms             
 K=1 as real entry 194.4 62.1 
 K=2 as entry in horticulture 767.9 143.5 
    
ExitK  Number of exiting firms   
 K=1 as real exit 339.0 73.6 
 K=2 as exit from horticulture 278.8 89.8 
    
WH,K Marshallian entry threshold, calculated 
for entering firm, 1000 euros*  
  
 K=1 as real entry 437.3 153.1 
 K=2 as entry in horticulture 190.1 77.8 
    
WL,K Marshallian exit** threshold, calculated 
for exiting firm, 1000 euros*  
  
 K=1 as real exit -235.6 61.1 
 K=2 as exit from horticulture -66.1 23.3 
    
*   Monetary values are normalised by 1985 prices  
** Exit thresholds were used for estimation as absolute values for the 
simplicity of the interpretation of results of the econometric model 
 
The FADN is an unbalanced panel data set, amongst others, on glasshouse 
horticulture firms during the period 1975-1999. Due to the rotation of firms, 
firms stay in the sample for an average of 3-5 years. These data provide a wide 
range of individual characteristics of firms such as revenue, capital, 
investments, variable costs, which we used for the estimation of the annual 
level of these variables. For the calculation of the trigger points, we used 
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variables from both data sets; however, due to the time period of FADN data, 
the further estimation is limited by the period 1975-1999.  
We distinguish and use for the analysis two different types of entry and 
exit: 1) the genuine (or real2) entry and exit, 2) the entry and exit by changing 
specialisation (e.g., when an existing firm shifts to or from glasshouse 
horticulture production).  
The variables represented in Table 1 are used for the calculation of trigger 
thresholds3. These variables characterise the average glasshouse firm, which 
earns 59,000 euros profit through the use of 2.3 ha of land (0.6 ha under glass) 
and employs 3.4 workers per year. The average firm invests 26900 Euros per 
ha in capital (such as land, glasshouses and installations). The salient 
characteristic of Dutch glasshouse firms is that they remain small-scale family 
firms (68.8% of family labour) with respect to labour and land, but they are 
highly capital-intensive, with an average capital per firm of 383,000 euros (at 
1985 price levels).  
The next step, as an extension of the conventional approach, will be to 
calculate Real Option trigger points and compare them with Marshallian ones. 
As can be seen, the investment thresholds (Table 2) vary over the years with 
the common tendency of growth. The gap between Marshallian and Real 
option trigger points varies and becomes bigger: if at the beginning of the 
analysed period the difference for entry was about 5,000 euros and for exit 
about 2,000 euros, then at the end it had risen to 30,000 and 14,000 euros 
respectively. Following the discussion in Dixit (1989), the difference between 
thresholds is caused by uncertainty. So the years with the biggest gap, namely 
1981, 1987, 1993, and 1996 possibly exhibit the effect of “hysteresis”, when 
firms prefer to wait and would need to overcome a higher threshold to make 
investments (in the case of entry) or disinvestments (in the case of exit). It can 
be also noted that the difference between entry trigger points is bigger than for 
exit trigger points; although in both cases the difference between Marshallian 
and Real Option thresholds is affected in the same years. 
 
                                                 
2
 We use terms “genuine” and “real” interchangeably for the definition of one of the types of 
entry or exit  
3
 A description of the calculation of trigger points by combining of two data sets is provided by 
Goncharova (2007: 127-128) 
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Table 2: Marshallian and Real Option trigger points 
Real Entry  
Trigger Points, 
1000 euros 
Real Exit  
Trigger Points, 
1000 euros 
Horticulture  
Marshallian  
Trigger Points,  
1000 euros Year 
Marshallian Real Option MarshallianReal Option Entry Exit 
       
1976 201.6 206.4 Na Na 17.1 na 
1977 222.8 228.6 -117.0 -119.2 91.8 -48.5 
1978 224.7 230.3 -154.1 -156.6 110.3 -52.9 
1979 274.1 280.9 -179.8 -182.9 140.4 -58.4 
1980 431.3 441.4 -243.0 -247.5 178.3 -68.1 
1981 544.5 557.5 -275.6 -280.8 164.3 -70.7 
1982 315.8 324.0 -242.0 -246.8 206.6 -86.3 
1983 344.3 354.4 -243.3 -248.9 175.8 -87.7 
1984 475.5 488.2 -179.0 -182.3 173.8 -64.8 
1985 342.6 352.5 -209.7 -213.7 184.6 -53.7 
1986 358.0 369.0 -251.0 -255.7 181.1 -41.5 
1987 385.0 400.1 -176.4 -181.8 191.8 -63.1 
1988 305.0 317.0 -168.1 -173.2 161.8 -43.8 
1989 366.2 380.6 -207.1 -213.9 235.3 -69.1 
1990 429.4 443.9 -158.5 -162.9 220.8 -16.9 
1991 521.9 539.7 -279.3 -287.4 243.4 -84.6 
1992 555.9 575.5 -354.7 -365.1 na na 
1993 666.1 696.4 -284.1 -295.5 312.1 -43.9 
1994 659.2 688.4 -264.2 -274.8 42.9 -72.8 
1995 600.0 626.5 -254.8 -265.1 241.3 -65.3 
1996 762.1 797.7 -344.2 -358.7 284.2 -90.3 
1997 388.7 407.8 -252.2 -263.3 196.1 -60.7 
1998 590.2 621.8 -292.8 -306.4 310.9 -134.5 
1999 529.7 558.1 -286.9 -300.4 306.9 -76.8 
       
Total 437.3 453.6 -235.6 -242.7 190.1 -66.1 
- Trigger points represent the annual average level        
-  na – not possible to calculate due to the absence of reliable data on 
horticulture entry/exit 
 
An existing firm that enters (exits) glasshouse horticulture has to overcome 
lower impediments compared to the real entry (exit). This is demonstrated by 
the difference in the investment trigger points: an existing firm that enters the 
horticulture sector should invest (on average, over the years) 190.1 thousand 
euros, but for a real entry a firm should invest almost twice as much, on 
average 437.3 thousand euros. For the real exit, a firm should overcome (on 
average) losses of 235.6 thousand euros, which is three times the threshold for 
the exit from the horticulture sector (loss of 66.1 thousand Euros).  
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4. Results of estimation econometric models  
 
 
The change in the level of trigger points can encourage or discourage exit 
and entry into glasshouse horticulture, as is shown in Tables 3-4. These tables 
give the negative binomial estimation results for entry and exit.  
The results lend support to the negative binomial model, since the λ  
parameter is significantly different from zero. This is confirmed by the 
Likelihood-ratio test. The significance of overdispersion parameter λ confirms 
the presence of an individual, unobserved effect that means non constant mean 
and variance in the data. By this fact, the outperforming level of Log-
Likelihood for Negative binomial regression over the Poisson model can be 
explained. The exit barriers were included in the model as the positive values 
for the purpose of easier interpretation. 
The difference among models is in the explanatory variables: Model 1 
includes Marshallian trigger points, Model 2 includes Real Option trigger 
points, which are corrected for the effect of expectation of prices, uncertainty, 
and interest rate; and Model 3 explicitly incorporates the expectation of prices, 
uncertainty and interest rate in Model 1, that deviates from the specification of 
Dixit (1992). Based on Pseudo R2, it can be concluded that the Model 3 
provides the best explanation of the variation of entry and exit out of three 
specifiations.  
As can be seen from the estimation results, a higher level of entry 
thresholds has a negative impact on the number of firms that decide to enter. 
Increasing exit thresholds deters firms from exiting the sector. In agreement 
with the theory, positive expectations about the trend of output prices induce 
more firms to enter and fewer firms to cease operation.  
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Table 3: Effect of Trigger Points on Real Entry and Exit  
Real Entry Real Exit 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable 
Trigger 
point  
WH,1 
Trigger 
point  
PH,1 
Trigger 
point  
WH,1 
Trigger 
point 
WL,1 
Trigger 
point 
PL,1 
Trigger 
point 
WL,1 
Dependent 
variable: Entry1 Exit1 
Independent 
variables:       
   TR  -0.002***(0.0004) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.001* 
(0.0006) 
-0.001* 
(0.0006) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
  µ  
  
12.269* 
(6.776)   
-19.020*** 
(3.785) 
  σ  
  
1.459 
(5.087)   
-7.300*** 
(2.554) 
  ρ  
  
0.095** 
(0.046)   
0.012 
(0.023) 
Constant 5.372*** (0.203) 
5.371*** 
(0.203) 
3.402*** 
(1.142) 
5.253*** 
(0.154) 
5.245*** 
(0.152) 
7.405*** 
(0.629) 
  λ  0.093 (0.028) 
0.091 
(0.027) 
0.057 
(0.018) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.357) 
Likelihood-
ratio test of 
λ  = 0: 
Chi2(01) 
 
334.79*** 
 
324.01***
 
183.13*** 
 
198.40*** 
 
199.20*** 
 
70.52*** 
Log 
likelihood:      
 
 
- Poisson 
model -299.12 -293.37 -217.81 -227.44 -227.87 -154.24 
- Negative 
binomial 
regression 
-131.72 -131.37 -126.24 -128.24 -128.27 -118.98 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.08 
N 24 24 24 23 23 23 
1) estimated standard deviations in parentheses 
2) *** denotes coefficient significant at 1% level, ** at 5%  and * at 10% level 
Higher interest rate, which is an indicator of the profitability of a sector, 
has a positive connection on entry, and a negative one for exit (except a real 
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exit, which is not significant). Uncertainty (σ ) has a positive (and not 
significant) result for real entry, but a negative one for entry into horticulture.  
 
Table 4: Effect of Trigger Points on Entry into and Exit from Horticulture 
Entry into Horticulture Exit from Horticulture 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable 
Trigger 
point  
WH,2 
Trigger 
point  
PH,2 
Trigger 
point  
WH,2 
Trigger 
point 
WL,2 
Trigger 
point 
PL,2 
Trigger 
point 
WL,2 
Dependent 
variable: Entry2 Exit2 
Independent 
variables:       
- TR  -0.002*** (0.0007) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
- µ    
-5.950 
(4.682)   
-17.941*** 
(7.048) 
- σ    
-3.115 
(3.958)   
-15.797*** 
(4.265) 
- ρ  
  
0.049* 
(0.028)   
-0.066* 
(0.039) 
Constant 7.639*** 
(0.148) 
7.626*** 
(0.144) 
6.433*** 
(0.813) 
6.600*** 
(0.210) 
6.597*** 
(0.205) 
9.070*** 
(1.186) 
λ  
0.039*** 
(0.012) 
0.039*** 
(0.012) 
0.025 
(0.008) 
0.093*** 
(0.030) 
0.092*** 
(0.030) 
0.042 
(0.014) 
Likelihood-
ration test 
of λ  = 0: 
Chi2(01) 
577.62*** 574.98*** 347.79*** 487.20*** 483.66*** 210.08*** 
Log 
likelihood:       
- Poisson 
model -424.10 -422.76 -304.86 -360.69 -358.84 -214.43 
- Negative 
binomial 
regression 
-135.29 -135.27 -130.97 -117.09 -117.00 -109.38 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 
N 21 21 21 20 20 20 
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This can be explained by the statement of Wennberg et al. (2007) that the 
negative effect of uncertainty on the likelihood of entry will turn positive at a 
high level of uncertainty for real entry but not for the entry of existing firms. 
Therefore the results can be understood as an indication of higher uncertainty 
for the real entry, compared to the entry into horticulture. The higher variation 
of input prices deters firms from exits; this effect is larger for exiting due to a 
change in specialisation. This means that firms prefer to delay the decision to 
exit, because of expectations of positive changes in prices. 
The presence of investment thresholds predetermines a certain number of 
firms that are able to overcome these thresholds and that decide to invest and 
enter (or to disinvest and exit). Changes in investment thresholds affect firms 
and change their behaviour in such a way that an additional number of firms 
will enter or exit. This effect of changes in trigger points can be demonstrated 
by analysing elasticities (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Elasticities for trigger points after Negative Binomial Estimation 
(Model 34) 
 Real Entry Real Exit Entry in Horticulture 
Exit from 
Horticulture 
Dependent variable: En1 Ex1 En2 Ex2 
Independent variable: TRH,1 TRL,1 TRH,2 TRL,2 
- trigger point W  -0.270 (0.11) 
-0.530 
(0.18) 
-0.733 
(0.82) 
-1.977 
(0.64) 
 
The establishment of a new firm can be expected if the real entry threshold 
decreases by 3,700 Euros. The real exit investment threshold should decrease 
by 1,900 Euros to induce an additional firm to cease trading. The difference in 
elasticities demonstrates the fact that existing firms respond more to changes in 
trigger points, because it is easier for these firms to overcome investment 
barriers. The changes in entry barriers should be bigger than for exit barriers to 
have an impact on a firm’s decision as can be seen from smaller values of 
elasticities for entry compared to exit thresholds. 
Another observation from the table is that the existing firms that enter or 
exit the horticulture sector are more sensitive to the changes in investment 
                                                 
4
 Model 3 is represented in Table 6, because, as is shown in Tables 4,5  and 7, Model 3 
outperforms other specifications  
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thresholds. It can be expected that with a 2,700 Euro decrease in the 
horticulture investment threshold (TRH,2), two more firms will enter the 
horticulture sector, while to encourage the establishment of the two additional 
firms the threshold (TRH,1) should decrease by 7,400 Euros. The same holds 
true for the exit: we can expect the exit from the horticulture sector of the two 
additional firms if the investment threshold (TRL,2) is bigger in absolute value 
by an amount of 1,000 euros; but for real exit TRL,1 should change by 3,800 
euros.  
 
Table 6: Predicted and Actual mean of Number of Entry and Exit firms 
 Real Entry Real Exit Entry into Horticulture 
Exit from 
Horticulture 
Number of Entry or 
Exit:     
- actual 194.4 (62.1) 
339.0 
(73.6) 
767.9 
(143.5) 
278.8 
(89.8) 
- predicted by:  
    
    Model 1  197.6 (46.1) 
339.6 
(37.5) 
803.7 
(133.5) 
289.4 
(56.7) 
    Model 2 197.4 (46.4) 
339.5 
(36.7) 
802.5 
(129.8) 
289.1 
(55.8) 
    Model 3 194.8 (46.9) 
339.0 
(57.5) 
785.1 
(86.7) 
277.7 
(51.3) 
 
By analysing the Table 6, we can compare how close the prediction can be 
compared to the actual average of events. It can be seen that real entry and exit 
events have closer predicted values than horticulture entry and exit. This can be 
related to the slower reaction to changes in investment thresholds, as discussed 
above. As a comment to the discussion about the real option approach, we can 
see that the use of RO trigger points only slightly improves the prediction of 
entry and exit, while assuming that characteristics of the sector influence the 
firm’s decision instead of changing trigger points (Model 3) gives the most 
accurate prediction. The preference for Model 3 can be also supported by the 
differences in values of Log-likelihood and Pseudo R2 provided in Tables 3-4. 
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5. Discussion, conclusions and further research 
 
We have examined empirically the entry-exit process in Dutch glasshouse 
horticulture as an investment decision of a firm that should overcome an 
investment threshold. Clearly investment triggers barriers impact on a firm’s 
decision to invest and enter, or to disinvest and exit. An increase in the barriers 
discourages firms from taking any action; they prefer to delay the decision, 
which is associated with irreversible investments. 
The models that include Marshallian and Real Option trigger points were 
compared.  
The explicitly calculated investment thresholds provide insights into the 
barriers that a firm should overcome and show the increase of competition in 
the sector, partially due to the use of capital-intensive technology in glasshouse 
horticulture. 
We distinguished two types: real (or genuine) entry-exit; glasshouse 
horticulture sector entry-exit. The heterogeneity of entry and exit investments 
has two consequences. First, firms will overcome different thresholds that can 
induce or deter firms from entry or exit. Second, the change in thresholds 
results in a different number of entering or exiting firms, e.g. existing firms 
whose specialization changes, resulting in them entering horticulture are more 
sensitive to the change in investment thresholds compared to firms, which 
potentially can enter the sector and which are considering establishing a new 
business. The difference in degree of irreversibility of the different types of 
entry and exit can be one of the reasons for this. 
The impact of thresholds can be a confirmation of the effect of 
irreversibility on an investment decision: if a threshold (as a sum of operational 
and fixed costs) is possible to be reversed, a firm will not take it into account.  
The empirical results do not provide reasonably strong support to real 
option theory, while the model that suggests the direct impact of the sector-
characterizing variables, such as expectation of output prices, uncertainty and 
interest rate, explains entry-exit decision better. The effect of these variables is 
larger for the real entry and exit compared to the change in specialization 
entry-exit. Moreover, uncertainty has a negative impact on exit and entry into 
horticulture, but turns out to be positive for the real entry. One of the possible 
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suggestions, which can be further explored in future research, is that for a 
higher level of uncertainty, the negative effect of uncertainty on the likelihood 
of entry can turn positive.  
The elasticities of changes in the level of trigger points on the number of 
entries or exits shows ‘higher’ elasticities for exits then for entries and also 
higher elasticities for shifts from and to horticulture than for real entries and 
exits: results which are intuitively very plausible. 
Further research can be conducted on deepening the knowledge of the 
individual firm’s decision for entry and exit which differentiates the 
heterogeneity of entry and exit. Thus it can have an important impact on the 
length of survival of firms, and on their post-entry performance. Investigating 
individual firms provide more opportunities to reflect on results. 
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